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ted
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 95 S. Ct.
2051 (1975).

A

Co-op City, a massive cooperative housing development in
New York City, is reputed to be the largest such project in the
United States.' Its construction was initiated and sponsored by
United Housing Foundation (UHF), a nonprofit corporation consisting of labor unions, civic groups, and other housing cooperatives. The purpose of Co-op City is to provide "decent" housing
for persons in middle- and lower-income brackets; hence, prospective residents must meet certain financial eligibility requirem e n t ~ Prospective
.~
residents purchase shares of common stock
in the cooperative corporation organized by UHF.3The literature
initially promoting that stock, distributed in 1965, estimated that
the average monthly carrying charge (rent) would be $23.02 per
room. Because of increased construction costs, the monthly carrying charge was periodically increased; by 1973-74, it was $35.27.
Outraged by the increased cost of their apartments, 57 residents, on behalf of all other apartment owners, sued UHF. Their
principal claim was that the information bulletin failed to disclose several material facts and falsely represented that the corporation would bear the cost of inflation. Specifically, the plaintiffs charged that the defendants had sold them securities and
were in violation of the antifraud provisions of the Federal Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 (Securities Acts).*The district court,
1. The district court described the magnitude of the project in these terms: "[T'jhe
project . . . houses some 45,000 people. The complex is located on a 200-acre site, includes
more than 30 high-rise buildings and more than 230 townhouses, which in total provide
about 15,400 apartment units ranging from three to seven rooms." Forman v. Community
Services, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1117, 1121 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
2. The maximum annual earnings of a family of three or less eligible for a four-room
apartment was initially $6,624; for a family of four or more, $7,728. Brief for Respondents
at 6, United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 95 S. Ct. 2051 (1975). It should also be
noted that from 1965 to 1973 the income eligibility requirements were increased to almost
double the initial requirements. Id. "[A111 of this is of little solace to the elderly and the
handicapped, or anyone on a fixed or sluggish income, or indeed, anyone who arranged
his affairs based on a belief that the earlier Co-op City estimates would remain unaffected
by changes in the economy." Forman v. Community Services, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1117,
1124 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
3. To secure the right to occupy his apartment, the prospective resident had to
complete a Subscription Agreement and Apartment Application form. In so doing, he had
to agree to subscribe to 18 shares of Riverbay common stock (Riverbay Corporation is a
mutual company organized by UHF) for each room in his apartment. Each share had a
par value of $25.00. 366 F. Supp. a t 1122.
4, The plaintiffs also asserted violations of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. $9 1983,
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in granting defendants' motion to dismiss, held that a share of a
"state-financed and supervised, nonprofit cooperative housing
corporation" is not a security under the federal securities laws
and hence, the federal courts had no juri~diction.~
The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding
that the definitional sections of the Securities Acts literally apply
since the shares were specifically denominated "stock," and alternatively, that the transaction was an investment contract
within the meaning of the Securities Acts? The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that shares in a nonprofit housing cooperative
corporation are not securities as defined by the Securities Acts.

A. Cooperative Housing
1. T h e history and status of cooperative housing
Housing cooperatives date back to the late 19th century7but
did not become a popular form of housing until the 1 9 2 0 ' ~Before
.~
the 1950's, apartment cooperatives were designed principally for
upper-income person^.^ By the end of World War 11, however, a
new trend in cooperative housing emerged as cities tried to cope
with the housing shortage caused by increased population. Cooperative housing units were constructed for middle- and lowerincome groups, the groups most seriously affected by the postwar
housing shortage.1° This trend was accelerated when Congress
enacted legislation providing for public financing and mortgage
insurance to private developers of apartments and cooperative
housing corporations.ll The New York State Legislature responded to the postwar housing shortage in that state by enacting
1988 (1971). The Supreme Court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the civil
rights claim should be dismissed since it was "vague and conclusory." 95 S. Ct. a t 2064
n.24.
5. Forman v. Community Services, Inc., 366 F. Supp. a t 1120-21.
6. Forman v. Community Services, Inc., 500 F.2d 1246, 1252-53 (2d Cir. 1974).
AND CONDOMINIUMS,
4
7. Goldstein, Introduction to Cooperatives, in COOPERATIVES
REAL ESTATELAW AND PRACTICETRANSCRIPT
SERIES79, 81 (J. McCord ed. 1969)
[hereinafter cited as Goldstein]. One of the earliest cases discussing cooperatives (though
not using that term) was Barrington Apt. Ass'n v. Watson, 45 Sup. Ct. 545 (N.Y. 1886),
enjoining a tenant-shareholder from subletting his apartment to someone "objectional"
to the other members of the association.
8. Miller, Cooperative Apartments: Real Estate or Securities?, 45 B.U.L. REV.465
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Miller].
9. See Goldstein, supra note 7, a t 82-85.
10. See Miller, supra note 8, a t 466.
11. Note, Co-operative Apartment Housing, 61 HARV.L. REV.1407, 1413-14 (1948).

8491

CASE NOTES

851

the Limited Profit Housing Companies Law, popularly known as
the Mitchell-Lama Act. l2 The Mitchell-Lama Act provided that
qualified housing corporations could borrow on mortgage from the
state or municipality up to 90 percent of the cost of the project
at an interest rate similar to that paid by the state on its own
obligations. l3
In addition to providing quality housing for lower- and
middle-income families, there are a number of reasons why cooperative housing is an attractive alternative to conventional home
ownership or apartment renting.14 For example, members in a
housing cooperative are able to share the burden of maintenance
costs.15 Also, cooperative apartment housing today may be less
the tenant-shareholder of a
expensive than renting.l"urther,
cooperative corporation receives an income tax deduction for his
share of the mortgage interest payments and property tax if his
cooperative meets the requirements of section 216 of the Internal
Revenue Code."
Despite the many advantages of cooperative housing, however, tenant -shareholders face some possible problems. Since
they do not hold fee simple title to their apartment, refinancing
is not available if the shareholder has need of cash.18The possibility also exists that the corporation may not be able to meet its
12. Mitchell, Forward to N.Y. PRIV.HOUS.FIN. at IX (McKinney 1962).
13. Id. a t X.
14. See Smadbeck, Basic Features of the Cooperative Trend, in COOPERATIVES
AND
CONDOMINIUMS,
4 REALESTATE
LAWAND PRACTICE
TRANSCRIPT
SERIES
88,89 (J. McCord ed.
1969).
15. See generally Miller, supra note 8.
16. Note Co-operative Apartment Housing, 61 HARV.L. REV.1407 (1948). "In addition, [tenant-shareholders] have learned that elimination of the landlord's profit and
some of his expenses may make a co-operative apartment more economical than ordinary
renting." Id. (citation omitted).
17. INT. REV.CODEOF 1954, Q 216 allows a deduction for the tenant-shareholder's
contribution to the property tax, mortgage interest, and business depreciation of the
cooperative housing corporation.
The tax advantages are best seen by comparing the tax positions of the
tenant in a conventional apartment house with those of the . . . tenantstockholders in a cooperative corporation. The former does not have an income
tax deduction for any part of his rental unless the premises are used for business
purposes or for the production of income. . . . The tenant-stockholder will be
entitled to an income tax deduction for a proportionate share of the real estate
taxes included in the so-called "Maintenance" charge for a cooperative . . . .
Kaster, Tax Aspects of Cooperatives and Condominiums, in COOPERATIVES
AND
CONDOMINIUMS,
4 REALESTATE
LAWAND PRACTICE
TRANSCRIPT
SERIES30,31 (J. McCord ed.
1969).
18. NELSON& WHITMAN,CASESAND MATERIALS
ON REALESTATEFINANCE
AND
DEVELOPMENT
776 (1976) [hereinafter cited as NELSON& WHITMAN].
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mortgage obligation. If the corporation were forced into default,
the interests of the shareholders could be endangered.lg This
threat has been largely mitigated, however, by the mortgage insurance provisions of the National Housing Acts.20
2.

The legal form of housing cooperatives

In general, a housing cooperative is "a corporate or business
trust entity holding title to the premises and granting rights of
occupancy to particular apartments by means of proprietary
leases or similar arrangement^."^' A cooperative housing development may take one of three legal forms:22(1)co-ownership,23(2)
the trust form,24or (3) the corporate form.25The corporate form
is by far the most convenient and common26and is also the form
t h a t gives rise to securities law question^.^' Co-op City is a
corporate-type cooperative.
19. Id.
20. 12 U.S.C. § 1715e (1970).
21. 1 ROHAN
& RESKIN,CONDOMINIUM
LAWAND P R A ~ I C§ E1.01[2] (1975) [hereinafter
& RESKIN].
cited as ROHAN
The form of lease used by the corporation for this purpose is called a 'proprietary lease.' A proprietary lease, is, in fact, a lease and not any other variety
of 'ownership document.' It is similar to an ordinary apartment lease, except
that it is reasonable and except for certain provisions peculiar to the tenantshareholder relationship with the cooperative-landlord corporation.
See Goldstein, supra note 7, a t 81.
22. 2 ROHAN
& RESKIN§ 2.01[1] (1974); Comment, A Survey of the Legal Aspects of
Cooperative Apartment Ownership, 16 U. MIAMIL. REV.305 (1961).
23. The co-ownership form can also be broken down into three forms: (1) joint tenancy, where all the tenants own the entire premises as co-owners in fee simple. To create
a cooperative of this type, there must be a conveyance to all the grantees simultaneously
by a single instrument. This is highly impractical for a large cooperative; (2) tenancy in
common, where the occupants own the entire premises as tenants in common but each
has exclusive rights to a specific apartment; (3) the California tenancy-in-common cooperative, where the purchaser receives an undivided fractional interest in the land and building. 2 ROHAN
& RESKIN§ 2.01[2] (1974).
24. In the trust form, a business trust is organized in which the trustees issue either
beneficial interest certificates to individual owners or the whole beneficial interest to the
project's organizer who then assigns the certificates to the purchasers. The purchasers are
& RESKIN9
also assigned the exclusive right to occupy an individual apartment. 2 ROHAN
2.01[3] (1974); See Yourman, Some Legal Aspects of Cooperative Housing, 12 LAW&
CONTEMP.
PROB.126, 127 (1947).
25. In this form, a corporation is organized by the promoter who acquires the buildings and the land; shares of the corporation are then sold to the prospective occupant who
& RESKIN§ 2.01[4] (1974);
receives a proprietary lease for a specific apartment. 2 ROHAN
Comment, A Survey of the Legal Aspects of Cooperative Apartment Ownership, 16 U.
MIAMIL. REV.305, 310-11 (1961).
26. Comment, Community Apartments: Condominium or Stock Cooperative?, 50
CALIF.L. REV.299 (1962).
27. See Miller, supra note 8.
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B. The Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934: What is a Security?
Both the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) and the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) contain sections that purport to define a security.2nIn spite of the comprehensive nature
of the definitions, however, it has been noted that "[tlhe definition of the term 'security' as used in the principal federal securities laws, is for the most part one of the best kept secrets in recent
legal history."2gCommentators and the courts, however, generally
agree that a flexible definition of a "security" is essential to meet
the purposes of the Securities Acts. Congress in drafting the legis; ~ ~courts' inlation appears to have intended such f l e ~ i b i l i t ythe
terpretations of the legislation have certainly promoted it.31
28. The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(l) (1970), provides:
The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profitsharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas or
other mineral rights or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known
as a 'security', or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or
interim, certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe
to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 8 78(c)(10) (1970), provides:
The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any
oil, gas or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
voting trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, or in general, any
instrument commonly known as a security . . . .
The definitional section of the 1934 Act relies heavily on the 1933 Act definition, and
while the two are substantially the same, there are some differences. L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION
478-79 (1951). See also 1 A. BROMBERG,
SECURITIES
LAW:FRAUD,
SEC RULE
10b-5 § 4.6 (312), a t 82.2 (1974). These differences, however, are immaterial in the context
of this case. 95 S. Ct. a t 2058 & n.11. " The Securities Act of 1933 . . . contains a definition
of security virtually identical to that contained in the 1934 Act. Consequently, we are
aided in our task by our prior decisions which have considered the meaning of security
under the 1933 Act." Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1967) (footnotes omitted).
29. Hannan & Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining
Federal Securities, 25 HAST.L.J. 219 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Hannan & Thomas].
30. H.R. REP. NO. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933), states that "[plaragraph (1)
defines the term 'security' in sufficiently broad and general terms so as to include within
that definition the many types of instruments that in our commercial world fall within
the ordinary concept of a security." See Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of
1933, 43 YALEL.J. 171, 182 (1934), where the authors observe that "[tlhe Act defines a
'security' in very broad terms. . . . The sweeping character of the definition was
presumably dictated by a desire to prevent the use of allied forms for purposes of evasion."
31. The Court in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195
(1963) states: "Congress intended the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 to be construed
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1. Investment contracts

One of the terms used in the Securities Acts to define a
"security" is investment contract.32While the term is undefined
in the statute, it had a long history of interpretation and use in
state securities regulatioP before it was adopted in the Federal
Securities Acts. The United States Supreme Court first dealt
with a n investment contract in S E C v. C.M. Joiner Leasing
C ~ r pIn. Joiner,
~ ~
the Court found an investment contract in the
sale of assignments of oil leases to specific parcels of land. Each
purchaser was induced to buy his assignment by the prospect of
profits from an oil well to be drilled on his
The Court
~ investment contract
declined to give a specific d e f i n i t i ~ nof~ an
but stated that "the test . . . is what character the instrument
is given in commerce by the terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, and the economic inducements held out to the prospect. "37
Three years later, in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. ,38 the Court
crystallized the definition of investment contract:
[A]n investment contract, for purposes of the Securities Act
means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party,
it being immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise are
evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal interests in the
physical assets employed in the e n t e r ~ r i s e . ~ ~

The Howey test thus includes four factors: (1) a person invests
his money, (2) in a common enterprise, and (3) is led to expect
profits (4) solely40 from the efforts of the promoter or a third
like other securities legislation 'enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds,' not technically
and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes."
32. Statutes cited in note 28 supra. " '[anvestment contract' . . . has become the
SECURITIES
AND FEDERAL
'catch-all that isn't otherwise caught' . . . ." 3 H. BLOOMENTHAL,
CORPORATE
LAW§ 2.02, a t 2-7 (1972) [hereinafter cited as H. BLOOMENTHAL].
REGULATION
314 & n.34 (1951); see, e.g., State v. Gopher Tire
33. L. Loss, SECURITIES
& Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937 (1920).
34. 320 U.S.344 (1943).
35. Id. a t 345-46.
36. Id. a t 355. ("In the present case we do nothing to the words of the Act; we merely
accept them. ")
37. Id. a t 352-53.
38. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
39. Id. a t 298-99.
40. While the test states that profits must come solely from the efforts of others, the
courts have construed the term solely to mean "primarily," in an effort to avoid a too
restrictive definition of a "security." SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d
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party.41The Supreme Court, recognizing that a scheme could
possibly be devised that technically evades the test, later added
that "in searching for the meaning and scope of the word 'security' in the [I9341 Act, form should be disregarded for substance
and the emphasis should be placed on economic reality."42
Since the Howey decision, courts have found the existence of
of investment contracts in a variety of contexts: deferred annuity
contracts,43fur-bearing animal breeding contracts,44mineral production contracts," distributorship contract^,^^ scotch whiskey
warehouse receipts,47and pyramid selling schemes.48
2. Form u. substance

In instances where the courts have found a security by disregarding form for substance, they have generally been expanding
the reach of securities l e g i ~ l a t i o n .This
~ ~ substance-over-form
analysis may also be used, however, to exclude certain transactions from the scope of securities regulation. For example, some
schemes or instruments may have the form of a security but,
when judged in the light of "economic reality,"50 cannot be
deemed securities in s ~ b s t a n c e .At
~ ' least three of the circuits, the
Third, Fifth, and Seventh, have opted for substance over form.52
476,481-82 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U S . 821 (1973); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary
Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479-80 (5th Cir. 1974).
41. Courts usually think of Howey as a three-pronged test, combining the third and
fourth factors noted here. Commentators, however, usually think of it in terms of these
supra note 32, a t 4 2.04; Hannan & Thomas, supra note
four factors. 3 H. BLOOMENTHAL,
29, a t 225.
42. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967). In Tcherepnin, the particular
type of security in question was an investment contract. In fact, the only type of security
the Supreme Court has concerned itself with to date has been an investment contract.
Hannan & Thomas, supra note 29, a t 219.
43. SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U S . 202 (1967).
44. Continental Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466, 470-71 (10th Cir. 1967).
45. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 442 F.2d 1124, 1127 (4th Cir. 1970).
46. Mitzner v. Cardet Int'l, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1262, 1265-68 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
47. SEC v. Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1386,1390 (E.D.N.Y. 1974),
aff'd, 493 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974).
48. SEC v. Glen W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 486 (9th Cir. 1973).
49. See C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G & G Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, 1357 (7th
Cir. 1975).
50. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U S . 332, 336 (1967).
51. Bank notes have the form of a security but generally not the substance. See
Comment, Commercial Notes and Definition of 'Security' Under Securities Exchange Act
of 1934: A Note is a Note is a Note?, 52 NEB. L. REV.478 (1973).
52. C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G & G Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir. 1975)
(a commercial note is not a security); McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir.
1974) (a one-year promissory note and a deed of trust issued for a bank loan allegedly
needed to pay the corporate obligation of a closely held corporation are not securities);
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On the other hand, the Second Circuit has adopted a literal
approach, selecting form over substance.53The validity of the
literal approach was one of the central issues in the instant case.

The respondents advanced two arguments in support of their
contention that their shares in the housing cooperative are securities.54First, under a literal application of the Securities Acts'
definitional sections, the shares are securities because they are
specifically denominated
Second, the shares of common stock are "investment contracts" or at least "instruments
commonly known as securities. "56
The Court rejected both arguments. It first noted that acts
of Congress must be construed within the framework of their
intent and not be bound by a literal construction and application.
The Court also noted that it is not likely that persons intending
to acquire a residential apartment will think they are investing
in securities "simply because the transaction is evidenced by
something called a share of stock."57The Court rejected the Second Circuit's and respondents' reliance on the language in Joiner
that "instruments may be included within [the definition of a
security], as [a] matter of law, if on their face they answer to
the name or descriptio~."~~
The Court termed the language dictum and reasoned that the Court in Joiner had not intended to
establish an "inflexible rule barring inquiry into the economic
realities underlying a t r a n s a c t i ~ n . " ~ ~
In rejecting respondents' second argument that the shares
are "investment contracts" or "instruments commonly known as
Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 695 (3d Cir. 1973) (promissory notes are not
securities where the notes are not procured for speculation or investment and where there
is no indication that the franchisor was soliciting venture capital).
53. 1050 Tenants Corp. v. Jakobson, 503 F.2d 1375, 1378 (2d Cir. 1974).
54. In order to establish jurisdiction, the plaintiffs needed to establish that the shares
they purchased were securities. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(q) (1970).
55. See note 28 supra.
56. Id.
57. 95 S. Ct. at 2060. The court also noted that these shares lacked all the characteristics that in commerce fall within the ordinary concept of a security. Among these are: (1)
the holder has a right to receive dividends, (2) the shares are negotiable, (3) they can be
pledged or hypothecated, (4) they confer voting rights in proportion to the number of
shares owned, and, (5) they can appreciate in value. The Court also stated that "substance
governs rather than form . . .just as some things which look like real estate are securities,
some things which look like securities are real estate." Id. at 2059 n.13 (citing 1L. Loss,
SECURITIES
REGULATION
493 (2d ed. 1961)).
58. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
59. 95 S. Ct. at 2059. See 53 TEXASL. REV.623, 629 (1975).
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securities,"" the Court again examined "the substance-the economic realities of the transaction-rather than the names . . .
employed by the parties? The Court restated the Howey test,
noting that there must be "the presence of an investment in a
common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits
to be derived from the entreprenurial or managerial efforts of
Respondents, anticipating this last requirement, had argued
that they were led to expect profits from their investment in three
ways. First, the promotional literature emphasized that they were
to receive an income tax deduction for the portion of their
monthly rental charge applied to the mortgage interest.'j3Second,
their monthly rental charges were to be substantially lower than
the going rates for comparable housing. Third, net income derived from the leasing of commercial facilities, parking places,
and laundry facilities was to be applied to reduce the residents'
monthly rental charges. In responding to these contentions, the
Court limited the definition of profits to mean "either capital
appreciation resulting from the development of the initial investment . . . or . . . earnings resulting from the use of the investors'
funds."" Applying this narrow definition of profit, the Court summarily dismissed the first two contentions but felt the third
contention-the possibility of profits from the leasing of
facilities-constituted a plausible argument. While this rental
income is the type of profit ordinarily expected by an investor, the
Court reasoned that in the present case the profit expectation was
too "speculative and insubstantial to bring the entire transaction
within the Securities
60. The Court noted that there is "no distinction, for present purposes, between an
'investment contract' and an 'instrument commonly known as a security.' " 95 S. Ct. at
2060.
61. Id.
62. Id. (emphasis added). In this formulation of the Howey test, the Court removed
the troublesome "solely" from the test, stating that there must be an expectation of profits
derived from the efforts of others; no mention was made that the profits derive solely from
the efforts of others.
63. See note 17 supra.
64. 95 S. Ct. a t 2060.
65. Id. at 2062.
The SEC filed an amicus curiae brief in support of respondents' position on this issue.
Ordinarily, the brief of the affected administrative agency would be entitled to great
weight. But in the instant case, the Court felt that the SEC's brief was in contradiction
to its previously stated position that the only real estate transactions considered by them
to be investments are those "offered and sold with emphasis on the economic benefits to
the purchaser to be derived from the managerial efforts [of others]." Id. at 2063 n.24.
See SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5347, 38 Fed. Reg. 1735 (1973).
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Three justices dissented, arguing that the respondents were
induced to purchase Co-op City shares by the prospect of economic benefits that would "come solely from the efforts of othe r ~ . The
" ~ ~dissenters also argued that all the other ingredients of
the Howey test were met and that the Court erred in its conclusion that shares of stock are not necessarily securities merely
because they are so defined in the Securities Acts.

By refusing to declare that shares of stock in a nonprofit
cooperative housing corporation are securities, the Court clarified
important aspects of securities regulation by (1) restricting the
scope of the Howey test and (2) resolving a division among circuit
courts concerning the use of the literal approach in defining securities. The Court also drew a much needed line of demarcation
between securities law and real property law and at the same time
avoided creating an unequal status before the law between two
similar types of real estate development: cooperatives and condominiums.

A. Limiting the Howey Test
On five occasions prior to its decision in the present case, the
Supreme Court has considered the definition of a security in the
context of an investment contra~t.~'
In each of the five cases the
Court has looked through the form of the transaction to its substance and found an investment contract. Since the second of
those cases, the traditional test for an investment contract has
been known as the Howey test;" it has consistently been applied
in state and federal court decision^.^^ The Court restricted the
scope of that test in the present case, however, by limiting the
definition of profits. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that
although the Court restricted the scope of Howey, it a t the same
time reaffirmed the validity of the Howey test for investment
contracts. With that limitation and reaffirmation, the Court gave
little, if any, satisfaction to critics of the test who have urged a
-

66. 95 S. Ct. at 2065-66.
67. SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U S . 202 (1967); Tcherepnin v. Knight,
389 U.S. 332 (1967); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65 (1959);
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S.
344 (1943).
68. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
69. Hannan & Thomas, supra note 29, at 225.
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br~aderinterpretation of profits and an expanded application of
the test.70
Many have proposed that the Howey test should be expanded to include a "risk capital" factor,71an approach adopted
by California in Silver Hills Country Club v. Sob i e ~ k iThe
. ~ ~risk
capital factor is present if the investor's funds are to be relied
upon to provide a substantial portion of the initial capital needed
to start the enterprise from which he expects some benefit.73The
respondents in the instant case urged the Court to enlarge the
Howey test to include the "risk capital" approach.74The Court,
however, fully aware of the literature on the subject,75specifically
declined to adopt the risk capital approach in this case, thus
casting some doubt on the approach's viability in the future.76
Closely related to the risk capital approach is the "valuable
benefit" concept.77Stated simply, if the investor is led to expect
some type of benefit, tangible or intangible, as a result of his
investment, the transaction constitutes a security.7sThe valuable
benefit concept, urged upon the Court by commentators and the
respondents in the present case as a useful enlargement on the
profits factor in Howey, was adopted by the Second C i r c ~ i t . ~ q y
narrowly defining profits, however, the Supreme Court excluded
the flexible approach hoped for by those who would expand
Howey and reaffirmed the necessity of the profit factor in the test
as originally formulated.
70. Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful
Formula?, 18 CASEW. RES. L. R~v.367(1967); See Hannan & Thomas, supra note 29;
Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities
Regulation, 24 OKLA.L. REV.135 (1971); Long, Introduction to Symposium: Interpreting
L.J.
the Statutory Definition of a Security: Some Pragmatic Considerations, 6 ST. MARY'S
96 (1974).
71. See, e.g., id.
72. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961).
73. State ex rel. Healy v. Consumer Business System, Inc., 5 Or. App. 19, 482 P.2d
549 (1971).
74. Brief for Respondents a t 54.
75. 95 S. Ct. a t 2063 n.23.
76. The Court did not reject the risk captial approach; it merely declined t a adopt it
in the present case. "Even if we were inclined to adopt such a 'risk capital' approach we
would not apply it in the present case." Id.
77. Two commentators explain the relationship between the two theories in these
terms: "[Tlhe valuable benefit concept and the risk capital theory are not separate and
distinct; they are, in fact, two sides of the same coin. " Hannan & Thomas, supra note 29,
a t 245 (citation omitted & emphasis added).
78. See Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of
Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA.L. REV.135, 164-65 (1971).
79. 500 F.2d a t 1254.
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B. The Literal Approach
Under the literal approach, a court declares an instrument a
security if on its face it appears to be one of those instruments or
transactions defined as a security, regardless of the substance of
. ~ ~noted above,81three of the circuits rejected
the t r a n s a c t i ~ nAs
the literal approach by declaring that certain notes are not securities even though the Securities Acts define securities as "any
note. ""The Second Circuit, however, explicitly adopted the literal approach in relation to shares in a cooperative housing corporation. Applying the rationale that substance, not form, should
govern, the Supreme Court settled this conflict in the instant case
by rejecting the literal approach.S3In all prior decisions, the
substance-over-form approach was used to expand the coverage
of the Securities Acts?' The present case constitutes the first
Supreme Court decision to limit the scope of the Acts by examining the substance of the transaction. This unique application of
the substance-over-form approach is noteworthy in that it demonstrates the restrictive nature of the Court's decision.
On public policy grounds, the Court's refusal to follow the
literal approach and thus bring cooperative housing developments within the scope of federal securities regulation is correct.
If the Court had construed the Securities Acts to include cooperatives, those developments would be subjected to the burdensome
registration requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Arguably, a developer would forego construction altogether rather than comply with those requirements. More likely,
the developer would adopt a form of development, such as condominiums, that generally do not fall within the scope of the
Securities Acts? At the very least, if the developer opted to take
advantage of state and federal incentives to construct cooperatives, the costs of compliance with securities regulations would
necessarily be passed on to residents of the cooperatives. Regulation, by generating these consequences, would thus frustrate the
public policy underlying state and federal legislative enactments:
cooperatives to provide housing for middle- and lower-income
families are needed and should be encouraged?
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
1975).

Id. at 1252.
See text accompanying note 52 supra.
See note 28 supra.

95 S. Ct. at 2058.
C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G & G Enterprises Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, 1357 (7th Cir.

85. See notes 87 & 88 and accompanying text infra.
86. See notes 10-13 and accompanying text supra.
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C. Regulation of Cooperative Housing Corporation
1. Excluding cooperative housing ventures from securities
regulation
By refusing to bring shares of nonprofit cooperative housing
corporations within the ambit of federal securities regulation, the
Court avoided creating an unequal status before the law between
cooperatives and condominiums. The end result of both forms of
real estate development are essentially the same although the
mode of ownership in each case is much different.87In the most
common type of housing cooperative, a corporation must be created in which the tenant-shareholders buy stock and thereby
effectively "own" their apartments. Condominium developers, on
the other hand, sell individual apartments in fee simple. If the
literal approach were applied, the stock of a cooperative corporation would be a security but the evidence of fee simple title to a
condominium would not. If securities questions are raised by the
sale of condominiums, it is not because of the form of the transaction but rather because the sale in substance constitutes a securit~.~~
2. Subjecting cooperative housing ventures to securities
regulation

The Court's rationale in the instant case does not mean that
the Securities Acts in all cases do not reach cooperative housing
corporations. The Court merely ruled that the "profits" claimed
by the respondents from the lease of Co-op City's commercial
facilities were too "speculative and insubstantial" to bring the
transaction within the scope of those Acts.89A cooperative, however, could be created where the profits were not so "speculative
and insubstantial." For example, a large building could be constructed in an urban area with only a few residential apartments
in the upper floors and the rest of the building leased for commercial use. Such a building could easily take the form of a cooperative corporation where almost all of the cost to the residents is
met by the rental income from the commercial users.
A difficult task in future cases will be, therefore, to determine a t what point the profits of a cooperative become sufficiently substantial to render the cooperative housing transcation
a security. The Internal Revenue Code offers a possible guideline
87. NELSON
& WHITMAN,
supra note 18, at 775.
& RESKIN$4 18.01-.06 (1975).
88. See generally 1A ROHAN
89. 95 S. Ct. at 2062.
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for making that determination. Section 216 of the Code requires
that 80 percent or more of a cooperative's gross income be derived
from tenant-shareholders in order for the cooperative to qualify
for a tax deduction.goCourts might be persuaded that if a cooperative corporation receives more than 20 percent of its gross income from sources other than the tenant-shareholders, such income is not "speculative and insubstantial." That "excessive"
income would render the cooperative housing transaction an investment contract subject to federal securities regulation.
Shares in a cooperative housing corporation could also be
classified as securities if the corporation did not have a right of
first refusal as to its outstanding shares? The absence of such a
right would enable the tenant-shareholders to sell their shares to
the highest bidder. In a cooperative the size of Co-op City that
has a waiting list several years long,92a thriving market could
emerge. It is not a t all unlikely that speculators would begin
buying cooperative shares with the hope of profits. Were that to
happen, the shares would clearly be securities and the cooperative would have to comply with the requirements of the Securities
Acts.
The Court, in holding that shares of a nonprofit cooperative
housing corporation are not securities, has left the regulation of
such cooperatives to real estate development laws and state blue
sky laws. It has not, however, closed the door of federal regulation
on schemes that have the form of a cooperative housing corporation but the substance of an investment contract.
90. See note 17 supra.
91. See 2 ROHAN& RESKINa t § 2.01[4][fl (1974); Whitebook, The Cooperative
Apartment, 9 PRAC.LAW.April 1963, a t 25, 29.
92. 366 F . Supp. a t 1123 n.24.

